University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
Philosophy ETDs

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Spring 4-7-2022

Towards A More Formal Understanding of Anyāpoha
Any poha
David P. Kasza

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/phil_etds
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Kasza, David P.. "Towards A More Formal Understanding of Anyāpoha." (2022).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/phil_etds/44

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at UNM Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy ETDs by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.

i

David Patrick Kasza
Candidate

Philosophy
Department

This thesis is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication:
Approved by the Thesis Committee:
Dr. Pierre-Julien Harter, Chairperson

Dr. Paul Livingston

Dr. Emily McRae

ii

Towards A More Formal Understanding of Anyāpoha

BY

David Kasza
PREVIOUS DEGREE
Bachelor of Arts in Psychology and Philosophy UCCS 2018

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
Philosophy
The University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico

May 2022

iii

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents Linda and Bruce Kasza and all teachers who
believed in me when I did not believe in myself.

iv

Towards A More Formal Understanding of Anyāpoha
by

David Kasza

B.A., Psychology and Philosophy University of Colorado Colorado Springs, 2018
M.A., Philosophy, University of New Mexico, 2022
ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to investigate if Digṇāga’s commitment that non-observation
(adarśanam) of the reason (adarśanam)and property to be proven (sādya) in the dissimilar
example (vyatireka dṛṣṭānta) is alone sufficient to ground the exclusion of other referents
(anyāpoha), as a valid inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) and proof for others
(parārthānumāna). To answer this question, four formal accounts of Digṇāga’s view of the
three characteristics (Trairūpya) of inference by Hayes, Katsura, Tillemans, and Oetke were
consulted. I argue a formal logical account of anyāpoha shows that vyatireka as the lone
sufficient example (dṛṣṭānta) in inference (anumāna) is false and does not lead to
ascertainment (niścaya). Making a valid inference for oneself or a proof for others
(svārthānumāna or parārthānumāna), requires that one must consider both examples
(anvaya and vyatireka dṛṣṭānta) to gain ascertainment (niścaya) from the inference
(anumāna).
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Introduction
Digṇāga’s pramāṇavāda theory is perhaps one of the most seminal influences on Buddhist
epistemology and logic.1 The doctrines of the three characteristics (Trairūpya) of inference
(anumāna) and exclusion of other referents (anyāpoha) hold great importance to the
understanding of the second pramāṇa, inference (anumāna). Formal explorations of
inference (anumāna) that ground anyāpoha as the referent (artha) of a general term
(jātiśabda), are similar but differ in their construction. Furthermore, the consequences of
accepting the negative evidence of the dissimilar example (vyatireka dṛṣṭānta), based upon
non-observation (adarśanam) 2 leads to questions about how exclusion of the other
(anyāpoha) functions logically. I argue a logical formalization of anyāpoha shows that, if the
vyatireka example (dṛṣṭānta) grounds anyāpoha by itself, then is not sufficient to produce
ascertainment (niścaya) from inference (anumāna). The inclusion of the similar example
(anvaya dṛṣṭānta) is necessary to gain ascertainment (niścaya) from that inference
(anumāna) and thus be a valid inference for oneself and a proof for others (svārthānumāna
and parārthānumāna) about the rule that has been given by someone who knows.3
An explication of the two types of cognition (pramāṇas), perception (pratyakṣa) and
inference (anumāna), can be found in chapter one of Digṇāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛitti
(PSV), which provides us with the first glimpse into how Digṇāga will argue for exclusion of
other referents (anyāpoha):

Mark Siderits et al., “Digṇāga’s Apoha Theory: It’s Presuppositions and Main Theoretical Implications,” in
Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp.
64-83, 65. Hereafter, Digṇāga’s Apoha Theory.
2
Ole Holten Pind, “Part 2,” in Dignāga's Philosophy of Language: Pramānasamuccayavṛtti V on anyāpoha, ed.
Ernst Steinkellner (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2015),123. Hereafter
Pind: Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language.
3
Pind: Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 183, 50b.
1
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“PSV I 2a-b: the means of cognition are [immediate and mediate, namely,] perception
(pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). They are only two because, “k2b-c, the object to be
cognized has [only] two aspects.”4
In as much as there are only two means of cognition, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference
(anumāna), they have divergent objects of cognition, perception (pratyakṣa) takes particulars
as its object (svalakṣaṇa/ bheda) and inference (anumāna) takes universals as its object
(sāmānyalakṣaṇa/jāti).5
A particular is the ineffable boundary that produces the horizon of knowing. A particular
is the “absolutely distinct,” “point instant,” which is unintelligible and inexpressible.6 A
particular, in being a “point instant,” is also seen as the event, which is the basis for the
construction of the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa, jāti).7 In as much as they constitute the basis
for the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa, jāti), the particulars accessible to perception (pratyakṣa)
are free from the application of concepts, meaning they remain cognitively neutral or
unmeaningful.8
However, it is suggested that the particular (svalakṣaṇa) is alone real and has the power of
producing an effect (arthakriyāśakti).9 Further, particulars are rigorously real, in that a
perception (pratyakṣa) that arises from a particular (bheda) is the same even when it is

Masaaki Hattori and Digṇāga “Section 1. Exposition of the Theory of Perception,” in Digṇāga on Perception:
Being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Digṇāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit Fragment and the Tibetan
Versions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 24. Hereafter, Hattori.
5
Hattori, 24.
6
Richard P. Hayes, Digṇāga on the Interpretation of Signs (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987), 13. Hereafter,
Hayes.
7
“M10_The Phenomenology of Meaning: Dinnāga to Ratnakīrti,” YouTube (YouTube, October 27, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHOEJWJW4sE&t=1386s.
8
Hayes 24.
9
Hattori, 14.
4
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broken and when there is mental abstraction.10 This concept plays an important role in
explaining what Digṇāga has in mind for the idea of the referent (artha), and what can be
said about it with a general term (jātiśabda). As the referent (artha) is infinite
(arthasyānantye)11 and the cause of the general term (jātiśabda),12 the referent (artha) could
be represented by an unlimited number of terms; yet a general term (jātiśabda) doesn’t
produce doubt (saṃśaya) about its referent (artha) because the general term (jātiśabda) only
denotes (bhāṣate) its own referent (svārtham) through the exclusion of other referents
(anyāpoha).13
Traditionally, Buddhists have denied the metaphysical position that universals
(sāmānyalakṣaṇa) have reality, and thus they are concepts that are mentally constructed, they
have no bearing on the world beyond the mental states that are accessible to us through their
pragmatic use.14 To understand why, Siderits and Chakrabarti suggest the theory that
descriptive terms, like “cow” are considered to be real entities, but after all “no one can bind
cowness with a rope, cut the tree’s essence, or have lunch with humanity,” thus, the
universals that allow for the production of these statements must have some imagined or
constructed nature and cannot contain any substantial reality.15 In keeping true with this
traditional understanding of the universal, Digṇāga claims the exclusion of other referents
(anyāpoha) is without division and without substance.16

10

Hayes, 96.
Pind: Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 119.
12
Pind: Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 121.
13
Pind: Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 2, 131.
14
Hayes, 20.
15
Mark Siderits et al., “Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition,” in Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism
and Human Cognition (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 1-49, 3. Hereafter, Chakra and
Siderits.
16
Pind: Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 135.
11
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Inference (anumāna) is the second kind of cognition in the pramāṇavāda tradition, and it
takes universals as its objects. Digṇāga’s aim is to explain how the structure of inference
(anumāna) that we make for ourselves and a proof for others (svārthānumāna and
parārthānumāna), without giving rise to doubt (saṃśaya) about a word’s application to its
referent by excluding of other referents (anyāpoha). Inferences (anumāna) are
conventionally real, which means there is no perception of them when they are broken into
parts.17 Nevertheless, the parts of inference (anumāna) are known to us through the doctrine
of Trairūpya (to be explained in depth shortly).
With an understanding of inference (anumāna), Digṇāga claims in the first twelve verses
of the PSV V that he can show how other theories of a universal term fail to accomplish
denotation without some type of doubt (saṃśaya) arising from them. Digṇāga claims his
theory of anyāpoha avoids these problems in verses PSV V 34a-36d. In those verses, he
claims, the general term (jātiśabda) “existent” (sat) does not denote (bhāṣate): 1. all its own
particulars (bhedānām) due to ambiguity, nor 2. the general property (jātimātre), nor 3. the
inherence relation (tadyoga), nor 4. the mere fact of possessing the general property
(jātimanmātra). 18 Exclusion of other referents (anyāpoha) is not a particular (bheda), so it
does not apply to any particulars, it is not dependent, nor does it transfer its meaning, nor is it
ambiguous, and it does not pervade any particulars because it has none. It can do this,
because unlike the four other views of the general term (jātiṣabda), anyāpoha is without
division and without substance.19 This insight will give us an idea of what he has in mind
when we start to generate our formal account of this conception of Trairūpya.

17

Hayes, 95.
Pind: Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 116, 128, 130, 132.
19
Pind: Dignaga’s Philosophy of Language, 133-135
18

5

Anyāpoha
Digṇāga’s answer to the problem of the general term’s (jātiśabda) relationship between
“language and world” is explained by the exclusion of other referents (anyāpoha) through
means of the third characteristic, the dissimilar example (vyatireka dṛṣṭānta) of the
Trairūpya.20 It should be mentioned that the terms, ‘restriction’ (niyama), ‘pervasion’
(vyāpti), and ‘concomitance’ (anubandha) are all synonymous. Digṇāga’s account of
language claims that negative evidence based upon non-observation (adarśanaṁ) is enough
to account for ascertainment (niścaya) from an inference (anumāna). 21 For this reason, and
for the reasons that the general term (jātiśabda) cannot denote its referent as has been argued,
Digṇāga develops his account of exclusion of the other (anyāpoha).
First, let us consider how Digṇāga interpreted inference’s (anumāna) role in anyāpoha as
it is stated in the PSV V, with a hope to provide a more abstract account of anyāpoha as we
move through what Digṇāga says about the nature of reasoning and words. In the beginning
of the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛitti Apohapariccheda (PSV V), Digṇāga claims that some have
thought that verbal cognition is a cognition unto itself, separate from the two pramāṇa,
perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna), but Digṇāga thinks this is not the case since
his view is translated by Hayes and Pind respectively as:
Hayes: PSV V 1.0.0: “Verbal communication is no different from inference as a means of
acquiring knowledge. For it names its object in a way similar to [an inferential sign such
as] the property of having been produced, [which indicates its object, namely, the property

20
21

Ole Pind: Digṇāga’s Apoha Theory, 65-66, 125. Digṇāga-Hayes, 252.
Ole Pind: Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 123.
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of being impermanent] by precluding what is incompatible [with the indicated
property]."22
Pind: PSV V 1.0.0: “Verbal cognition (śābdam) is not a means of cognition separate from
inference (anumānāt). For it denotes (bhāṣate) its own referent (svārtham) by exclusion of
other referents (anyāpoha) like [the general property] ‘being produced’ and the like.”23
Said more simply, anyāpoha theory states that a word indicates its own object or referent
(svārtham) through the exclusion of other incompatible referents (anyāpoha) by means of
Trairūpya alone, just as the reason (hetu), smoke, indicates the property to be proven (sādya),
fire, belonging to the object of inference (anumeya), a mountain. Further, the word, “cow”
simply means that the object is not a non-cow.24 The passage is provided in order to explain
that verbal cognition, should be considered as subjected to the constraints of the Trairūpya,
since the word behaves in the same way as those things which indicate their own form by
means of Trairūpya.25 Given the importance of Trairūpya to Digṇāga’s account of the
exclusion of other referents (anyāpoha) in his account of inference as verbal cognition, an
account of Trairūpya’s tripartite characteristics is necessary to understand whether vyatireka
can stand alone and do the job of anyāpoha.
The exclusion of other referents (anyāpoha), which Digṇāga explains in PSV V, is his
thinking about the role of non-observation (adarśanam) in producing valid inferences for
oneself (svārthānumāna) and a proof for others (parārthānumāna) specifically in regard to
the infinitely representable referent (artha) by means of a general term (jātiśabda) which

22

Hayes, 25
Ole Pind Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 3.
24
Dignaga-Hayes, 252.
25
Ole Pind Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 219.
23
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denotes it through exclusion of other referents (anyāpoha). To the degree that Trairūpya and
anyāpoha represent Digṇāga’s thinking on the structure of anumāna, it is important to
investigate the nature of his thought on the topic of anumāna through the lens of the
Trairūpya, to establish a clearer understanding of the nature of anumāna’s ability to produce
ascertainment (niścaya) by means of valid inferences for ourselves (svārthānumāna) and a
proof for others (parārthānumāna) of the referent (artha) by means of a word (sabda).
Even though Digṇāga was the first main proponent of the pramānavāda school and
anyāpoha has been around in Buddhist schools of thought for at least a millennium and a
half, there remains very little regarding a logical formalization of Trairūpya as it concerns
anyāpoha in contemporary logical language. Yet, recently, there has been significant work
by people like Katsura and Oetke in the formal development of Trairūpya in Digṇāga’s
earlier chapters of the PSV II and IV that help explicate his commitments to the nature of
inference (anumāna).
The literature on formal aspects of Digṇāga’s version of Trairūpya has produced different
formulations of his account of the three characteristics of Trairūpya. All the formulations of
the Trairūpya include accounts of both positive and negative pervasions (anvaya and
vyatireka vyāpti). The inclusion of anvaya as a part of a valid inference (anumāna) becomes
problematic for Digṇāga in his development of anyāpoha, as he claims it shows that when
words (śabda) are both observed (darśanam) when their co-referring terms are absent and
not-observed (adarśanam) when their co-referring terms are present.26 However, in other
parts of his work Digṇāga debates the primacy of each respective example (dṛṣṭānta), since

26

Ole Pind Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 125. Verse 35.
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in earlier chapters he confronts the problem of the redundancy of the vyatireka vyāpti in PSV
II 5cd.27

27

Claus Oetke, Studies on the Doctrine of Trairūpya (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische
Studien, Universität Wien, 1994), 61. Hereafter, Oetke.

9

Formal Accounts of Trairūpya
The roots of Digṇāga’s position come from the Trairūpya account of inference
(anumāna) developed by the Nyāya school. Digṇāga’s account of inference (anumāna) has
three characteristics. The first characteristic of the trairūpya is the membership of reason
(hetu) in the object to be inferred (anumeya), which expresses the reason being a property of
the topic (pakṣa) of a proposition (pakṣadharmatva). The second and third characteristics are
the statements of the examples which prove an inseparable relation (avinābhāva),28 positive
concomitance (anvaya anubandha) and negative concomitance (vyatireka annubandha), all
of which will be discussed in depth now from various perspectives of Hayes, Katsura,
Tillemans, and Oetke. The goal of looking at these different perspectives of the three
characteristics of inference (Trairūpya), is to produce a formal account of what Digṇāga had
in mind about how we can gain ascertainment (niścaya) about what we have been told by
someone who knows by forming valid inferences (svārthānumāna) using the rule they
provide.29
Hayes’ System
The most basic account of Digṇāga’s system was provided by Hayes, is his work on
Digṇāga’s Interpretation of Sign, where he attempts to formalize the foundations of
Digṇāga’s theory of language in what Hayes develops and names the “Hayes-Digṇāga
system of logic,” hereafter (Hayes’ system). This system provides the first semi-formal
western account of Hayes’ interpretation of Digṇāga’s theory of knowledge from a

Shoryu Katsura and Ernst Steinkellner, “The Role of Drstanta in Dignāga's Logic,” in The Role of the
Example (dr̥ṣṭānta) in Classical Indian Logic (Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien,
Universität Wien, 2004), 137-141. Hereafter, Katsura, The Role of dṛṣṭānta in Digṇāga’s Logic.
29
Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 183. Verse 50b.
28
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combination of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, and the Hetucakranirṇaya (HCN), which espouses
Digṇāga’s theory of knowledge.30
It is stated that the purpose of the HCN was to understand how relations between two
classes of individuals are mediated by a third class of individuals.31 As was mentioned
earlier, the first aspect of the work that we will see employed in understanding anyāpoha is
the concept of pervasion, “whether one class contains another,” (vyāpti), whether the two
classes are disjoint (virodha), or whether the two classes overlap (vyabhicāra),” which
ultimately determines what kind of claims we can make about the identity of the two classes
in question.32 The first pervasion (vyāpti) will act as a useful guide to the two types of
examples (dṛṣṭānta) that Digṇāga relies on to formulate his account of the Trairūpya, to
produce ascertainment (niścaya) through valid inference for oneself and in turn a proof for
others (svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna).
The two classes that Hayes used to explicate the logic of the similar (anvaya) and
dissimilar (vyatireka) example (dṛṣṭānta) pulled from the HCN, are the possessors of the
property to be used as evidence/reason (hetu), and the class of properties that is to be
confirmed though evidence (sādyadharma).33 The domain of properties that consists of the
subject of inference/inferable object (pakṣa/anumeya), is seen as, “a limited sample of the
universe of individuals,” which contains the class of properties whose relationship to
sādyadharma is possible, i.e the reason (hetu) alone.34 Further, two other “classes” of
individuals are expressed in what Hayes describes as the induction domain. These are the

30

Hayes, 61.
Hayes, 112-13.
32
Hayes, 113.
33
Hayes, 113.
34
Hayes, 113.
31
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class of similar instances that are like the subject (sapakṣa) and a class of dissimilar instances
(asapakṣa/vipakṣa) that are not like the subject.35 He describes the relationship between the
reason (hetu) and these two other classes as follows:
1. Anvaya = (Association): ⌐PHS > 0
a. There exists at least one individual in the induction domain that is a member of the
evidence (hetu) class and also a member of the subject-like class (sapakṣa).36 So,
we might see smoke on a mountain.
2. Vyatireka = (Dissociation): ⌐PH⌐S = 0
a. There exists no individual that is a member of both the evidence (hetu) and the “unsubject-like” class (asapakṣa).37 We will never find smoke on a lake.
Hayes uses association (anvaya) and dissociation (vyatireka) formulations from the
Trairūpya to help explain the relations between the hetu and the sapakṣa or the asapakṣa.38
In this effort, however, Hayes creates a great amount of ambiguity in his formulations of
these two relations (vyāpti), in that he equivocates two definitions or mistakenly believes that
the sapakṣa and vipakṣa act as the sādya. This being that he defines “S” as the property to be
confirmed (sādya) but contradicts the claim in his definition of the anvaya and vyatireka
when he claims the reason (hetu) is related to the subject or un-subject like classes, which he
defines as the sapakṣa or the asapakṣa.
Hayes’ account of the anvaya and vyatireka leaves much to be desired since his use of
informal language also leaves significant ambiguity as to what kind of relationship is being
35

Hayes, 116
Hayes, 118.
37
Hayes, 118.
38
Digṇāga’s Apoha Theory, 70. We also see these terms referred to as, “Concordance (association, joint
presence, anvaya) and difference (joint absence, vyatireka).”
36
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drawn between the reason (hetu) and its effect/consequent/property to be proven (sādya).
They are ambiguous because they draw the relation between the hetu and the sapakṣa and the
hetu and the asapakṣa/vipakṣa, meaning we can only infer the membership of smoke on a
mountain or on a non-mountain but not the reason/evidence’s (hetu) relation with the
property to be proven (sādya). In the natural language example of the two accounts, we can
see that smoke is an indicator of fire on mountains but not fire on lakes, so thinking about
anvaya and vyatireka in this way doesn’t tell us anything about the nature of the invariable
concomitance (avinābhāva) between the hetu and sādya.
Importantly, the anvaya and vyatireka relations have been explored by several authors,
since the Trairūpya has been used by Sanskrit Grammarians as a method of inquiry as well:
Anvaya and vyatireka are used to establish the meaningfulness of components and to
ascribe individual meanings to components ... consists in observing the concurrent
occurrence (anvaya) of a certain meaning and a certain linguistic unit and the absence of a
meaning and a unit.39
Fortunately, these semi-formal and muddled accounts of the subject (pakṣa), object to be
inferred (anumeya), and examples (dṛṣṭānta), are unique to Hayes’ understanding of
Digṇāga’s Trairūpya. This means that differing accounts provided by other contemporary
authors like Katsura, Oetke, and Tillemans, create a clearer although incongruent formal
account of the nature of the parts of proof for oneself and a proof for others (svārthānumāna
and parārthānumāna). Katsura and Oetke did most of the groundwork, with Katsura’s
commentary and translation of PSV IV and Oetke’s commentary on PS II 5cd. These

39

Hayes, 119.
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descriptions vary, but include accounts of the pakṣa and the anumeya, as well as the two
dṛṣṭānta’s, anvaya and vyatireka, and their descriptions of the inseparable relation
(avinābhāva) between the reason (hetu) and the property to be proven (sādya) in the sapakṣa
and vipakṣa classes.
Katsura
Katsura provides a much clearer explication of the three characteristics that make up the
Trairūpya. The first characteristic of the Trairūpya accounts for the ascertainment (niścaya)
of the inferential mark in the state of affairs to be inferred (anumeya e.g. ‘The top of a
mountain’).40 The statement of the reason (hetu) is made in order to indicate that the reason
(hetu) is a property of the state of affairs to be inferred (anumeya). Smoke is on top of the
mountain. These examples (dṛṣṭānta) are defined in PSV IV 2:
An example is that [object] in which a reason (hetu) is shown to be followed by a property
to be proved (sādya) or to be absent in the absence of a property to be proved; it is of two
kinds: 'similar' (sādharmya) and another (i.e., 'dissimilar' vaidharmya).41
The role of the statement of the example (dṛṣṭānta-vacana) in a proof, is to present the
inseparable relation (avinābhāva) between a reason/proving property (hetu, sādhanadharma),
and the property to be proven (sādyadharma).42 The same is true of the logical mark (liṅga,
cause) and the logically marked (liṅgin, that which is to be inferred, effect) and the referent
(artha) is considered to be the cause of the word (śabda) for Digṇāga.43 This relation
explained by the example is also called restriction (niyama), pervasion (vyāpti) and

Katsura, The Role of dṛṣṭānta in Digṇāga’s Logic, 136.
Katsura, The Role of dṛṣṭānta in Digṇāga’s Logic, 141 PSV IV 2.
42
Katsura, The Role of dṛṣṭānta in Digṇāga’s Logic, 139.
43
Ole Pind: Digṇāga’s Philosophy of Language, 121.
40
41
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concomitance (anubandha).44 Like Hayes, Katsura argues that Digṇāga’s example statements
(dṛṣṭānta) express the pervasion (vyāpti) of a proving property (hetu) by a property to be
proven (sādya), or the absence of the proving property (hetu) in the absence of the property
to be proven (sādya).
Further, we can say anvaya is an inseparable relation (avinābhāvin) when/if the reason,
proving property, inferential mark (hetu, sādhanadharma, liṅga) (P) is present, then the
property to be proven, inferentially marked (sādyadharma, liṅgin)(Q) is present.45 Katsura
suggests that the similar and dissimilar example (anvaya and vyatireka dṛṣṭānta) can be
presented in the logical form of the conditional, because the structure laid out in inference
(anumāna) of reason (hetu) (P) and the property to be proven (sādya) (Q) is that of a
conditional statement:46
Anvaya: When the smoke (hetu) (P) is present, then the property to be proved fire (sādya)
(Q) is present.47
Yad P tad Q.
If x is P, then x is Q. Px → Qx
Vyatireka: When the property to be proved (sādya), fire, is absent (⌐Q), then the reason
(hetu), smoke, is absent (⌐P).48
Yad not-Q tad not-P.
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If x is not-Q, then x is not-P. ⌐Qx → ⌐Px49
Katsura goes further to explain the structure of a valid proof for others
(parārthānumāna) which is a mirror of the process that we have already completed for
ourselves. The formulation is a formal account of proof 2 given in PSV IV, which we have
adapted to include the smoke and fire example:50
1. (Reason): Because the mountain possesses smoke, (Proposition): the mountain possesses
fire.
2. Whatever possesses smoke is observed (darśanam) to possess fire. Like a plateau.
3. Whatever is not-observed (adarśanam) to possess fire, does not possess smoke. Like a
lake.51
The formulation of the logical proof (parārthānumāna) in Digṇāga’s proof 2
indicates that we infer from a specific instance, namely the mountain’s possession of smoke,
that if the inferential mark (hetu, liṅga), smoke, is observed (darśanam), then the mountain’s
inferentially marked (sādya, liṅgin), fire, will also be observed (darśanam). Further, in the
absence of the observation (adarśanam) of fire, there is non-observation (adarśanam) of
smoke.
Why are the accounts of anvaya and vyatireka as conditionals formulated as “Px →
Qx” and “not-Qx → not-Px” and not in another way such as “Px → Qx and not-Px → notQx,” the latter expressing the stronger necessary and sufficient conditions that are normally
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used to establish identity or mutual codependence?52 Oekte claims, “there is evidence to the
effect that the Trairūpya-cannon in the theories of Śaṅkarasvāmin and Digṇāga was
conceived as furnishing a necessary, but not a both necessary and sufficient criterion of the
acceptability of logical reasons and indirectly of proofs and inferences.”53 This seems evident
by the fact that Digṇāga explicitly claims that we should not accept the formulation of the
necessary and sufficient condition in PSV IV 4. In that we have an account of Dignaga’s
rejection of the use of the necessary and sufficient conditions together to form a valid
inference for oneself and a proof for others (svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna), it seems
that Digṇāga knew about necessary and sufficient conditions but chose to reject them in favor
of the contraposition of the similar pervasion (anvaya vyāpti) when formulating the
dissimilar pervasion (vyatireka vyāpti).54
The verse PSV IV 4 commits Digṇāga to the position that the statements Qx → Px,
not-Qx → not-Px, as similar and dissimilar examples respectively, lead to contradiction when
reasoning about eternity and production. Due to the problems created by sufficient and
necessary conditions, it appears that Digṇāga wrote of this account of reasoning, because it
leads to doubt (saṃśaya) in the case of eternity and production, (i.e. the relation of necessity
and sufficiency does not hold for being a result and sensation, nor for eternity and not being a
product), since in each case the property to be proved, proves its opposite.55 As a response to
this realization in PSV IV 4, Digṇāga developed his theory by defining the vyatireka as the
contraposition of anvaya. We see this contraposition reflected in his formal account of a
proof for others (parārthānumāna) presented in proof 2 of PSV IV which Katsura has taken
Katsura, The Role of dṛṣṭānta in Digṇāga’s Logic, 154.
Oetke ,72
54
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the time to formalize in quantificational logic, a theme that will continue in our contemporary
accounts of Trairūpya:
a = anumeya = mountain Q = Fire P = Smoke
[reason] Pa: Because the mountain possesses smoke, [proposition] Qa: a mountain possesses
fire.
Similar example (anvaya dṛṣṭānta): (∀x)(Px → Qx) & (∃x)((Px & Qx) & (x ≠ а))
We can observe the following two natural language examples for Katsura’s the anvaya
relation.
a. Whatever is observed (darśanam) to possess smoke possesses fire, e.g., like a plateau.
b. For all “x” if “x” is observed (darśanam) to have smoke then “x” is observed
(darśanam) to have fire, and for some “x,” “x” is observed (darśanam) to have smoke
and “x” is observed (darśanam) to have fire and “x” is not a mountain.
Dissimilar example (vyatireka dṛṣṭānta): (∀x)( ⌐Qx → ⌐Px) & (∃x)(( ⌐Px & ⌐Qx) & (x ≠ а))
We can observe the following two natural language examples for the vyatireka relation.
a. Whatever is not-observed (adarśanam) to possess fire, does not possess smoke, e.g.,
like a lake.
b. For all “x” if “x” is not-observed (adarśanam) to have fire, then “x” is not-observed
(adarśanam) to have smoke , and for some “x,” “x” is not-observed (adarśanam) to
have smoke and “x” is not-observed (adarśanam) to have fire and “x” is not a
mountain. 56
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Unfortunately, the variable “x” is never defined in any of the texts but given its context
the variable “x” appears to refer to the state of affairs present to perception (pratyakṣa) that is
like the object to be inferred (anumeya) which one wishes to make an inference about.

If we look carefully, the two examples are not in contraposition, since the statements of
the sapakṣa and vipakṣa classes are added to their respective anvaya and vyatireka relations
by being given their own formal statements. Katsura interprets Digṇāga as expressing each
class by adding a statement to convey the sapakṣa, “like a plateau” and vipakṣa, “like a
lake,” with the existentially quantified statements that make up the second half of his formal
accounts. Given the explicit inclusion of a concrete example of the sapakṣa or vipakṣa in his
formal accounts of the anvaya and vyatireka dṛṣṭānta it seems that our formal account should
include a reference to them in order to draw out a conclusion from the conditional statements
that precede them and to gain ascertainment (niścaya) of the observation (darśanam)
following the rule defined by the reason (hetu) and the proposition (pakṣadharmatva).
Tillemans
Tillemans’ work with the Trairūpya, provides insights into the reason why the pakṣa
should be excluded from the domain of inference of the anvaya and vyatireka relations and
which version of anvaya and vyatireka we should accept. In his consideration of the formal
account of anvaya and vyatireka, he addresses the claim made by Gillion and Love which
assumes that the two are equivalent if the pakṣa is not a member of the consequent P of the
anvaya and not mentioned in the vyatireka:
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1. (∀x)(( Hx → (Sx & ⌐Px) ↔ (∀x)( ⌐Sx → ⌐Hx)57
a. For anything “x,” if “x” is observed (darśanaṁ) to have the reason (hetu), smoke,
then it will be observed (darśanaṁ) to have the property to be proven (sādya),
fire, and not the pakṣa,” is the equivalent of, “for anything “x,” If “x” is notobserved (adarśanaṁ) to have the property to be proven (sādya), fire, then it will
not be observed (adarśanaṁ) to have the reason (hetu), smoke.”
There seem to be several issues with including the pakṣa as a general term, in one and not
the other, and in the consequent. The pakṣa “Px” means that, “x” is observed (darśanam) to
have the pakṣa condition,’ and in the anvaya relation the reason (hetu), infers the sādya and
is not the pakṣa, but we know the reason (hetu) is a member of the pakṣa. Further, we know
that the pakṣa is never a member of the vipakṣa by means of vyatireka by the nature of a
vipakṣa being dissimilar. However, the pakṣa is not expressed in the vyatireka relation as a
negation in the antecedent with the sādya. If we are to explicitly state that the reason is
occurring in the pakṣa, but “x” is not, it seems unreasonable to come to the conclusion that
the pakṣa should not be symbolized as being excluded from the sapakṣa and vipakṣa in both
anvaya and vyatireka. Thus, it seems important to make the move that others make in the
formal account of the theory by switching the pakṣa from a general term to a singular term.
We can either express the relation between the variable when it “x” is not a member of
the pakṣa with -Px, or express the relationship as x ≠ p, where “p” stands for the singular
instance of an individual constant, the mountain (anumeya), having the possibility to express
the reason (hetu), smoke. If we express the pakṣa in the stronger way as a general term
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(jātiśabda), it creates issues of the reason (hetu) inferring the lack of a pakṣa. Also, if the
pakṣa is included as a general term, then we see that it should be included in the third
characteristics of the Trairūpya the vyatireka, which creates the issue of the reason (hetu)
inferring the lack of a pakṣa. If we are to avoid the problems created by the pakṣa being
included as a general term, then we can represent the pakṣa as an individual constant “p” for
the object to be inferred (anumeya), mountain, accompanied by the reason (hetu), smoke,
since it is a particular instance, and we are trying to use the reason to draw similar sapakṣa
and dissimilar vipakṣa examples by means of anvaya and vyatireka. We can express the
absence of the pakṣa from the anvaya and vyatireka relations as x ≠ p. When we use x ≠ p it
shows us more clearly that the anvaya and vyatireka relations are equivalent by
contraposition:
2. (∀x)((x ≠ p & Hx) → Sx) ↔ (∀x)(( x ≠ p & ⌐Sx) → ⌐Hx)58
a. For anything “x,” if “x” is not identical to the pakṣa and it is observed (darśanam)
to have the reason (hetu), smoke, then it will also be observed (darśanam) to have
the property to be proved (sādya), fire, is equivalent to, if anything “x” is notidentical to the pakṣa and it is not-observed (adarśanam) to have the property to
be proven (sādya), then it will also not be observed (adarśanam) to have the
reason (hetu).
This reading of equivalence by contraposition has created many difficulties in
understanding Digṇāga’s commitments to Trairūpya, since although he was aware of the
concept of the necessary and sufficient conditions in PSV IV 4, he favors a standard account
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of the conditional “If P, then Q,” and its equivalent contrapositive for the forms of anvaya
and vyatireka to produce valid inferences for oneself and a proof for others (svārthānumāna
and parārthānumāna). Thus, we can see that Tillemans suggests we read the anvaya and
vyatireka conditions as stated above in 2 and 2a of this section.
Oetke
Oetke begins his formal account of Digṇāga with a grounding in the Vādavidhi of
Vashubahdu,59 and the Nyāyapraveśa, a Nyāya text which was composed around the same
time or soon after Digṇāga.60 He and Tillemans have used this framework, although
accepting different statements from it, to try and formally explain what Digṇāga’s position is
on anvaya and vyatireka, given his commitments to various formal accounts of the Trairūpya
that he lays out in the PSV II 5cd. Oetke presents two definitions for us to consider when we
think about what kind of inseparable relation (avinābhāva) is being drawn between the
“probans” (reason, hetu) and the “probandum” (property to be proven, sādya):
“Def 1: The logical reason is the pronouncement of a property which does not occur without
that which is inseparably connected with, a probandum.”
“Def 2: Inference is the observation (darśanam) of an object not occurring without the
probandum for someone who knows that.”61
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In the first definition, the proponent is committed to the restrictive stance that, if the
property sādya is absent, then the property hetu will also be absent. In other words, if we see
smoke on a mountain, then we have the indication that there is fire on the mountain since the
two always occur in inseparable relation (avinābhāva) to one another. The first definition
also expresses this relationship between properties, i.e. smoke is a property of fire and thus
the definition indicates that the smoke and fire are properties of the mountain as well. The
use of properties to describe the entities that make up the inference is less desirable for
Digṇāga’s purposes, since he explicitly rejects that a general term (jāti) denotes (bhāṣate
particulars (bhedānām).62
Definition two provides a more inductive meaning to the nature of inferences. Inference
is the act of observing the hetu to not occur without the sādya. Said more clearly, when there
is a person who knows smoke does not occur without fire, if the reason (hetu) smoke is
observed (darśanaṁ) on the object to be inferred (anumeya), the mountain, then the property
to be proven (sādya), fire, is said to be observed (darśanaṁ) as well. We are speaking about
a particular instance of experience that depends on the observer having been shown the
referent’s (artha) connection to the word (śabda) by someone to whom the connection is
already known.63 Thus, it appears that the second, inductive definition is more favorable to
our understanding of the position that Digṇāga accepts, since the meaning of a word is
primarily the ability of vyatireka to produce the non-observation (adarśanaṁ) of other
referents.64
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Oetke develops a similar formal account to the one developed by Katsura in his
description of the inseparable connection (avinābhāva) that we see described in the
definitions provided by the Vādavidhi of Vasubandhu. Here, we can easily see the reason for
the uses of “H” to indicate the probans (reason, proving property, hetu, liṅga,
sādhanadharma) and “S” to indicate the probandum (effect, property to be proven, sādya,
liṅgin, sādyadharma) and the immediate similarities to the account provided by Katsura of
the anumeya and vyatireka vyāpti:
1. ⌐(∃x)(Hx & ⌐Sx)
a. It is not the case, that there is an “x” such that “x” is observed (darśanaṁ) to have
the reason (hetu), smoke, and “x” is not-observed (adarśanaṁ) to have the property
to be proven (sādya), fire.
2. (∀x)(Hx → Sx)
a. If anything “x” is observed (darśanaṁ) to have the reason (hetu), smoke, then “x”
is observed (darśanaṁ) to have the property to be proven (sādya), fire.
3. (∀x)( ⌐Sx → ⌐Hx).65
a. If anything “x” is not-observed (adarśanaṁ) to have the property to be proven
(sādya), fire, then “x” is not-observed (adarśanaṁ) to have the reason (hetu),
smoke.
In these formal logical accounts, as was alluded to above, we can see that each of
these statements are equivalent. Making the claim, ‘There is a non-observation (adarśanam)
of something which possess the hetu and which does not possess the sādya,’ is the same as
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saying, ‘for all observations (darśanam), if something possesses the hetu, then it possesses
the sādya. However, we can’t gather from these statements anything regarding the anumeya,
the sapakṣa or vipakṣa, because the anumeya establishes the object of inference that one
knows. We are trying to draw inference for the hetu and sādya in examples (dṛṣṭānta) of
instances that are similar and dissimilar to that first experience of smoke at that specific
object of inference (anumeya) and apply it more generally.
We can gather from PSV IV 2 and the formal accounts above that the reason (hetu)
should be in anything that is similar by virtue of the fact that it is observed (darśanaṁ) to
exhibit the property to be proven (sādya) in those things similar to the pakṣa but not identical
with it.66The vipakṣa is not-observed (adarśanaṁ) to exhibit the proving property (hetu) or to
be proved (sādya). So, in this case, it seems clear that, if “x” is a vipakṣa, then “x” will not be
a member of the pakṣa or sapakṣa and it will not contain the sādya either.67
Although these formal logical descriptions are an attempt only to explicate the
definition of inseparable relation (avinābhāva), they bear the identical formulation to the first
parts of Katsura’s formal accounts of anvaya and vyatireka. This identity leads me to think
that the vacillation between the primacy of the anvaya and vyatireka in different parts of
Digṇāga’s writing in the PSV II 5cd and PSV V 34’s vṛitti as well as elsewhere in PSV V,
explains what Digṇāga was thinking about the nature of his commitments to the structure of
the Trairūpya that had him confused about what a statement of each dṛṣṭānta really
contained. Further, the equivalence indicates why so much work has been done to show that
the two are not equivalent, since such a robust system seems to be misunderstood if it comes
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out to be saying the same thing in both the anvaya and vyatireka relations. However, in the
case of Digṇāga at least, it appears that even if equivalence of the two dṛṣṭānta is avoidable,
the use of anvaya in valid inferences for oneself and a proof for others (svārthānumāna and
parārthānumāna) seems not to be.
Oetke claims that his interpretation of Digṇāga’s PSV II 5cd, avoids the
complications that are present in the apparent equivalence of the anvaya and vyatireka
vyāpti.68 PSV II 5cd presents an account of Digṇāga rejecting that the vyatireka is redundant
in light of the statement of the pakṣa and anvaya in his version of the Trairūpya. The first
sentence characterizes the doctrine of Trairūpya concisely, in that it is meant to describe
what the three characteristics accomplish:
“A property indicator must be present in the object of inference and in what is similar to it,
and absent in what is not similar to it.”69
The reason (hetu) is present in the object of inference (anumeya) and what is similar
to it, the sapakṣa, and absent in what is not similar to it, the vipakṣa. It is said further, that the
second characteristic (anvaya) is restrictive in such a way that the proving property (hetu) is
present only in what is similar to the object of interference (anumeya), the sapakṣa, by means
of its positive pervasion (anvaya vyāpti) with the property to be proven (sādya).70 The
restriction of the reason (hetu) to what is similar to the object of inference (anumeya), the
sapakṣa-domain by means of positive concomitance (anvaya) only denotes (bhāṣate) the
presence of the reason (hetu) and the property to be proven (sādya) at that specific referent.
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It may be argued by an opponent that, if the anvaya relation only (eva) denotes
(bhāṣate) the restriction of a reason (hetu) to the pakṣa and sapakṣa alone, then by
implication the reason is never included in the vipakṣa. If this is true, it seems that the
statement of (anvaya) alone is sufficient to show the object only occurs in the pakṣa and
sapakṣa to do the work of refuting other referents that are not that singular referent meant to
be denoted (bhāṣate) by the word.71 Thus, the ability of the restriction of the reason, the
anumeya and sapakṣa seems to create a problem, namely the superfluous generation of the
vipakṣa condition, in that the vipakṣa is just a restatement of the sapakṣa.72 However, this
restriction is tempered by the statement (tattulye sadbhava eva) that the logical reason is just
similar and not necessarily present in all similar instances of the object of inference
(anumeya).73
The weak existential import implied by using the term sadbhāvaḥ, means that the
logical reason occurs in at least one instance of the sapakṣa instead of the logical reason
occurring at all instances of the sapakṣa. This means that the anvaya should not be
considered to have universal import. If the anvaya does not have universal import and the
reason (hetu) is excluded from all instances of vipakṣa, the vyatireka vyāpti needs to be stated
to determine the reason (hetu) and (sādya) are not observed (adarśanaṁ) in any instances of
the vipakṣa. So, while pakṣa and anvaya are sufficient to show that the logical reason occurs
in the pakṣa and elsewhere only in sapakṣa, which in turn excludes most instances of the
reason from the sapakṣa, it is argued that the dissimilar example (vyatireka dṛṣṭānta) of the
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hetu and the sādya outside vipakṣa must be included in order to determine that the hetu does
not occur in the vipakṣa at all.74
Oetke describes what he believes is the correct interpretation of the formulation of the
dṛṣṭānta of Trairūpya that produce a valid inference for oneself or a proof for others
(svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna). The first characteristic, the pakṣa, is always
considered to be an instance where only the logical reason occurs.75 Regarding the second
characteristic, the anvaya dṛṣṭānta, Oetke claims, based on his reading of PS II 5cd, that we
should take the anvaya of the sapakṣa as formalized by:
4. (∃x)(x ≠ p & (Hx & Sx))76
a. Something “x” is not identical with the pakṣa, and “x” is observed (darśanaṁ) to
exhibit the reason (hetu) and the property to be proven (sādya).
In this case, we see that the hetu and the sādya are not in a conditional relationship, but
rather a conjunction, restricting their observation (darśanam) to one another in a specific
instance. If one can establish that the hetu is only a part of the pakṣa, and hetu and sādya
though anvaya vyāpti are only a part of the sapakṣa, then we cannot conclude that the logical
reason is contained in only those two from the evidence we have alone in the pakṣa and
anvaya. Thus, the superfluous vyatireka relation is avoided because it is needed to show that
there are no instances where the reason occurs in the dissimilar relation. So, in that the
vyatireka attempts to express the non-observation (adarśanam) of the property to be proven
(sādya) with the non-observation (adarśanam) of the proving property (hetu), in the case of
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the vipakṣa, the vyatireka should be expressed as a conditional similar to what is presented
by Katsura in his formal account of PSV IV proof 2. Thus, Oetke gives us two different
accounts of how we could understand the vyatireka as given his reading of PS II 5cd:
5. (∀x)(( x ≠ p & ⌐Sx) → ⌐Hx)77
a. If anything, which is not identical with the pakṣa and is not-observed
(adarśanam) to have the property to be proven (sādya), fire, is not-observed
(adarśanam) to have the reason (hetu), smoke.

6. (∀x)(( x ≠ p & ⌐Sx) → ⌐Hx) & (∃x)(x ≠ p & ⌐Sx)78
a. If anything, which is not identical with the pakṣa and is not-observed
(adarśanam) to have the property to be proven (sādya), fire, it is not-observed
(adarśanam) to have the reason (hetu), smoke, and there is at least one thing that
is not identical with the pakṣa that is not-observed (adarśanam) to have the
property to be proven (sādya), fire.
Both 5 and 6 in this section, represent the restrictive interpretation of vipakṣa that we
have mentioned above, since they exclude the pakṣa from both the observation (darśanam) at
hand and from anywhere the sādya is not-observed (adarśanam), in the case of 6. With these
formulations in hand, Oetke seems to be in agreement with Digṇāga when Digṇāga argues
against those who claim the problem of the vyatireka of the hetu and sādya to the vipakṣa is
redundant, because it is implied by the statement of the reasons restricted relation with the
pakṣa and the sapakṣa.79 If the anvaya is a conjunction with an existential quantifier, then the
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vyatireka vyāpti must be expressed in order to determine that the reason (hetu) is absent in
the vipakṣa. To infer that the occurrence of the non-observation (adarśanam) of the reason
(hetu), the occurrence of the property to be proven (sādya), fire, must also not be observed.
In other words, that both the hetu is observed (darśanam) to occur when the sādya is and the
hetu is not observed to occur in the lack of it’s sādya. Unfortunately, as discussed above, this
type of reasoning requires that we support the idea of the necessary and sufficient conditions,
which has been explicitly rejected by Digṇāga in PSV IV 4.

30

A Combined View
Now, given the account of vyatireka just provided by Oetke, we can see that there are
some notable differences between his and Katsura’s accounts:
Katsura: (∀x)( ⌐Qx → ⌐Px) & (∃x)(( ⌐Px & ⌐Qx) & (x ≠ а)).80
a. If anything is not-observed (adarśanam) to possess fire, it is not-observed
(adarśanam) to possess smoke, e.g., like a lake.
b. If anything is not observed (adarśanam) to have the property to be proven
(sādya), fire, it is not observed (adarśanam) to have the reason (hetu), smoke, and
there is at least one thing that is not observed (adarśanam) to have the reason
(hetu), smoke, and not observed (adarśanam) to have the property to be proven
(sādya), fire, and that thing is not identical with the anumeya.

Oetke: (∀x)(( x ≠ p & ⌐Sx) → ⌐Hx) & (∃x)(x ≠ p & ⌐Sx)81
a. If anything which is not identical with the pakṣa and is not observed (adarśanam)
to have the property to be proven (sādya), fire, it is not observed (adarśanam) to
have the reason (hetu), smoke, and there is at least one thing that is not identical
with the pakṣa that is not observed (adarśanam) to have the property to be proven
(sādya), fire.
First, the anumeya is restricted only by the second existential statement in the case of
Katsura, where Oetke instead restricts the pakṣa (the reason (hetu) occurrence in the
(anumeya). It seems that although Katsura’s inclusion of the lack of identity of the object of
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Katsura, 150.
Oetke, 27.
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inference “x,” with the object of inference already known “a,” is more correct than the pakṣa
interpretation, its distribution across both statements is needed to be clear that we are not
referring to the object of inference that we already know.
Katsura and Tillemans both commit to formal accounts of anvaya and vyatireka that are
very close to the second vyatireka condition “6” of Oetke. The universal qualifier means that
the anvaya and vyatireka relations implie all instances of the reason (hetu), smoke, are
invariably concomitant (avinābhāva) with the property to be proven (sādya), fire, and
separate from the pakṣa, but also there is observed (darśanam) at least one instance in which
reason (hetu) and the property to be proven (sādya) are found to be in conjunction. Oetke’s
logical commitments in his formulation of anvaya confines him to the conception that what
Digṇāga means by expressing the anvaya dṛṣṭānta is actually a conjunction. So an anvaya
dṛṣṭānta only expresses the observation (darśanam) of smoke and fire together, apart from
the first instance of the reason’s (hetu) occurrence with the object of inference (anumeya).
Given the evidence from Katsura’s and Tillemans’ and Oetke’s formulation of vyatireka, it
seems more reasonable to consider the anvaya and vyatireka dṛṣṭānta as conditional
statements that function as members of a proof.
Thus, we can revise both the anvaya and vyatireka dṛṣṭānta to exclude the object to be
inferred (anumeya) and not the reasons (hetu), smoke, occurrence in the (anumeya),
mountain, the (pakṣa). We can formulate a proof that remains true to the commitments that
Digṇāga makes in PSV IV proof 2 as well as Katsura, Oetke, and Tillemans formulations to
guide a fresh formal account of a valid inference for oneself or a proof for others
(svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna):
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1. (∀a) (Pa → Qa)
a. Every instance of the mountain/If the (anumeya) mountain possesses smoke, the
(anumeya) mountain possess fire.

2. (∀x)((x ≠ a & Px) → Qx) & (∃x)(x ≠ a & Px)
a. If anything, which is not identical with the anumeya and is observed (darśanam)
to have the reason (hetu), smoke, then it will have the property to be proven
(sādya), fire, and there is at least one thing that is not identical with the anumeya
that is observed (darśanam) to have the reason (hetu) smoke.

3. (∀x)(( x ≠ a & ⌐Qx) → ⌐Px) & (∃x)(x ≠ a & ⌐Qx)
a. If anything, which is not identical with the anumeya and is not observed
(adarśanam) to have the property to be proven (sādya), fire, then it is not
observed (adarśanam) to have the reason (hetu), smoke, and there is at least one
thing that is not identical with the anumeya that is not observed (adarśanam) to
have the property to be proven (sādya), fire.
The question as to whether the first and second conditions of the Trairūpya indicate
that the logical reason occurs only in pakṣa, and the sapakṣa-domain is all that is required to
restrict the reason to the sapakṣa-domain and exclude it from the vipakṣa seems to be
dismissible given the three statements above. However, the pushback to the argument that the
pakṣa and anvaya are sufficient to denote (bhāṣate) the absence of the reason (hetu) from the
vipakṣa challenges the idea that vyatireka is alone sufficient to accomplish the exclusion of
other referents (anyāpoha). This seems clearer if we consider anyāpoha to be logically
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formalized by 1 and 3 above. Given our formal account of vyatireka, we can only conclude
via modus ponens that when fire is absent, smoke is absent, or if we perform contraposition
first, modus tollens about half of the reasoning that we need in order to gain ascertainment
from our inferences (anumāna).
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Conclusion
The best way to test a method of reasoning that is meant to produce ascertainment
(niścaya) and avoid doubt (saṃśaya), is to put that reasoning to a test. If we take the
avinābhāva of the reason (hetu), smoke, and the property to be proven (sādya), fire, to be a
general law, then we can use anvaya and vyatireka to conclude that we have in fact
determined that the object of inference that we are not familiar with “x,” contains
membership in those things that fit the rule and does not contain membership in those things
that do not fit the rule. Our general rule has been provided by someone who knows that
invariable connection (avinābhāva) between smoke and fire. So, we know that ‘If there is
smoke then there is always fire,’ is a valid inference for oneself and others (svārthānumāna
and parārthānumāna).
If we are given a set of instances that we would need to confirm our rule, we need to
look at the instances where the reason (hetu) is observed (darśanam) with the property to be
proven (sādya) and the case where if we do not observe (adarśanam) the property to be
proven (sādya), then we do not observe (adarśanam) the reason (hetu). In other words, we
confirm that we have both the modus ponens and tollens relations. A clear example of this
type of reasoning is the Wason 4-card selection task, in which a simple rule is given by
someone who knows that there is a relation between vowels and even numbers. In this case,
one is asked to confirm the rule ‘if the card is observed to have a vowel on one side, then it is
observed to have an even number on the other side,’ by choosing which cards to flip over
from a set of four cards observed to have A, K, 2, 7 showing. In this case, to confirm the rule,
we must select two different cards, the A and the 7. We select the A because, if we observe
an A (vowel), then we should observe an even number on the other side. We select 7
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because, if we don’t observe an even number, then we should not observe a vowel on the
other side.
For the same reasons, we must use both anvaya and vyatireka to confirm our previous
observation of the reason (hetu) and the proposition (pakṣadharmatva) in the (anumeya)
which defines the rule. Given the example above about the reasoning imbedded in the
Trairūpya to confirm a rule provided by someone who knows, it seems impossible within
these constraints to form a valid inference for oneself and a proof for others (svārthānumāna
and parārthānumāna) without the use of both anvaya and vyatireka dṛṣṭānta. We can see in a
formal account of the properties of the anvaya and vyatireka dṛṣṭānta that they are not
equivalent, and both are needed to form a valid inference for oneself or a proof for others
(svārthānumāna or parārthānumāna). Thus, in the case of the exclusion of other referents
(anyāpoha) as denoting the general term (jātiśabda), it is false that we can use vyatireka
alone or primarily to create inferences (anumāna) as Digṇāga suggests. Therefore, the use of
anvaya is necessary in an inference for oneself or proof for others (svārthānumāna or
parārthānumāna) to prove the invariable relation (avinābhāva) of the general rule between
the hetu, sādya, and anumeya provided by someone who already knows.
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